#### The 1AC’s fascination with nature as the foundation for new identities replicates 19th Century US colonialist logic as it corralled Native American populations onto reservations. The U.S. attempted to edify the Native past through the appropriation of native spiritual connection to the Land, making the acquisition of Native Land the primary strategy for forging a unified, assimilated, and nationalistic “American Identity”

Kavanagh 11 (\*Sarah Schnyder Kavanagh pg. 154-158 Sarah Schneider Kavanagh's research focuses on the pedagogy of teacher education Postdoctoral Scholar at the University of Washington, “Haunting Remains: Educating a New American Citizenry at Indian Hill Cemetery”, Phantom Past, Indigenous Presence: Native Ghosts in North American Culture/ made in 2011/ edited by Colleen E. Boyd & thrush \*editorial chapters done by multiple authors, Kavanagh is one section // EBOOK DOA 9/1/16 KAE+GK)

Although the American Revolution marked the birth of the new nation-state, it was not until several decades later that U.S. citizens realized that their experimental government could transform into a lasting republic. American victories in the War of 1812 revealed that a unified national culture and history could help the United States become a “nation among nations.”12 In his discussion of the cultural roots of nationalism, Benedict Anderson writes that “nation-states… always loom out of an immemorial past, and, still more important, glide into a limitless future.”13 And so as American citizens realized that their experiment in republican government had this potential for a “limitless future,” they were faced with the daunting task of constructing for themselves an “immemorial past.” Wince accomplishing this task would be no small feat, it is not surprising that the end of the War of 1812 marked the beginning of what Blanche Linden-Ward has termed the “American monument-building era”—how better to construct the immemorial than with monuments and memorials? This era was defined by an explosion of cultural and artistic production in support of the men and principles that had founded the nation: a carving of a new U.S. history into old American stone.14 In 1836 Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote, “Our age is retrospective. It builds the sepulchers of the fathers. It writes biographies, history, criticism. The foregoing generation beheld God and nature face to face; we, through their eyes.”15 Although American history was being consciously constructed through many forms, including literature, painting, and oratory, it is no surprise that Emerson highlights the building of “sepulchers of the fathers” as the primary project of his era. Early-nineteenth-century scholars were quite aware of the implications of the fixation on tomb building. This fixation was made most visible through the Rural Cemetery Movement,16 an integral development in the conscious construction of U.S. history.17 In 1850 the creation of Indian Hill cemetery marked the spread of the mid-nineteenth-century monument-building fever into Middletown, Connecticut. The cemetery project, much like rural cemetery projects all along the east coast, was at its heart a patriotic enterprise.18 In his speech at the Indian Hill Cemetery dedication, Olin discussed how the site would instill patriotism in its visitors: “I trust I am no visionary, but I also give credit, in advance, to this enterprise for contributing something towards erecting a past for posterity—towards establishing a common centre for edifying remembrances and holy associations—a common ground where we of the present may wait to greet the men of the future, to commune with them and impart such lessons of wisdom as we have in store. I venture, also, to rely upon this improvement to strengthen, or even to create in some individuals and families much-needed local attachments, so essential an element of real patriotism.”19 Olin’s focus on the patriotic purpose of the new cemetery echoes the sentiments of speakers at cemetery dedication ceremonies across the country during the nineteenth century.20 The rural-cemetery movement as a whole was informed by the needs of the monument-building era: **the goal was to create national identity through the construction of an American past rooted in American soil.** Such attempts at U.S. cultural production were often critiqued by European artists and scholars who agreed that architecture and art would be unsuccessful in creating a national culture and inciting true patriotism if the aesthetics used were borrowed and not developed “Indigenously.”21 In spite of these critiques, the decades following the War of 1812 saw countless artistic attempts aimed at the construction of a national past. Linden-Ward claims that the “creation of public monuments and pastoral cemetery landscapes revealed Americans’ ability to adapt borrowed aesthetic forms to create their own usable past through self commemoration.”22 However, nineteenth-century American must have agreed, at least in part, with European critiques. Even a brief glimpse into the relationship of the United States to both European and Native American populations makes clear that Euro-Americans “borrowed” much more than “aesthetic forms” to create a distinctly American past**. They borrowed, appropriated, and abstracted native American identities in order to create a U.S. national identity and lay claim to American land. Without a claim to land upon which to anchor their nascent nation, Euro-Americans’ claim to nationhood was unsustainable.** Richard Grusin argues, “The construction of American identity has always been inseparable from nature. Unlike European nations, whose identity derived from a common language, ethnic or racial heritage, religion, or cultural history, the identity of the United States of America as ‘nature’s nation’ **was grounded in** large part in **the land itself**.”23 Because of this connection between land and nation, non-Natives have attempted to claim Indigenous identities to validate their own construction of national identity.24 **The first claim is that Indigenous peoples belong to whites as a child belongs to a parent. Second, Indigenous identities have been claimed through the appropriation of Indigenous symbols, actions, and histories.** These Euro-American claims to Indigenous identity manifest themselves in the histories and mythologies that Euro-Americans have created to stabilize their nation.25 From the American Revolution to the present day, examples abound of whites donning faux-Indian attire, yelping ultra-stereotyped war whoops, or engaging in stereotyped “Indian” rituals in moments of national crisis. In Playing Indian, Philip Deloria argues that these actions are associated with the white American need to dissociate with Europe and claim a different national heritage. He argues that whites covet what they have historically viewed as the Native connection to the land and its spirit.26 This is in part because a sense of place and an attachment to the land were prerequisites for the creation of a U.S. national identity. The Boston mayor Josiah Quincy stated in 1813 that “loyalty to place” was the nineteenth-century U.S. citizen’s primary connection with the nation.27 Ideas about the relationship between “loyalty to place” and national identity were not foreign to Middletown residents in the mid-nineteenth century. In fact, Stephen Olin spoke to the need for a loyalty to place in his speech at the 1850 opening of Indian Hill Cemetery. Discussing the creation of the cemetery, he expressed his “strong hope that [it] and similar improvements [that had] become so common in [the United States], [would] contribute, in some small measure, towards providing for one of the most urgent, though little appreciated wants for our great republic… the want of local attachments, and in so far as this essential element is concerned of love of country.”28 Olin, like many nineteenth-century whites, was dedicated to the task of connecting his vision for the nation to the American landscape. In order to implant a national vision into the land itself, whites needed to grapp le not only with the history of American citizens and their forefathers but also with the Native peoples Indigenous to the land. In order for the United States to become a legitimate nation, it had to become, as one unknown writer said in 1828 “a perfect union of the past and present; the rigor of a nation just born walking over the hallowed ashes of a race whose history is too early for a record, and surrounded by the living forms of people hovering between the two.”29 The drive for this perfect union of Native past with white present led whites toward two courses of action in their relations with Native peoples. First, if white Americans were to posit any claim over the land, they had to adopt the history, identity, and “spirit of the land” that belonged to the Native peoples Indigenous to the continent and glorify it, since it held such a central position in any sense of American nation.30 Second, through attempts at the ethnocide of Native American populations, whites tried to transform living societies into “the hallowed ashes of a race.” As I will explore in the next section, this ethnocide was carried out both in the flesh and by the pen.”

#### Deleuzian notions of identity destabilization are a disappearing act of the past experiences that Native subjecthood relies on. The 1AC is a process of forgetting that exorcises these spiritually present experiences of colonial domination—the 1AC is a site of Native erasure

Wuthnow 02 (Julie Wuthnow, University of Canterbury, "Deleuze in the postcolonial: On nomads and indigenous politics", 2002, Feminist Theory Sage publishing, pp 183-185 //Accessed 10/12/16 GK)

I begin with these starkly contrasting passages in order to give a sense of the wide gulf between the perspectives that I will need to negotiate in placing Deleuzian theory and some versions of indigenous politics in conversation with one another. Can they speak to one another at all? More specifically, are indigenous political struggles helped or hindered by what might be called a Deleuzian ‘anti-ontology’?1 I will argue that Deleuzian frameworks are potentially counterproductive to effective indigenous politics and, moreover, that central notions of Deleuzian thinking, such as ‘nomad thought’, can operate to enact what Vandana Shiva has termed a ‘politics of disappearance’ of local or indigenous knowledge systems (Shiva, 1993: 9) and experiences, thereby delegitimizing the politics that might arise out of those experiences and ways of knowing. I come to this work as a political theorist most strongly influenced by a combination of Anglo-American feminism and poststructuralist theory, and I have a sense of belonging within the broad and ambiguous terrain captured by the terms postcolonial and cultural studies. What is significant here is that all of these affiliations are linked to fields of study that at least claim to have deeply political groundings and explicit commitments to social justice for all peoples. Thus, in my view, all those working within this broad area of study must be vigilant regarding the effects of their work within the social world in general and, more specifically for the purposes of this article, in the terrain of indigenous struggles; they must work to help rather than hinder these struggles if they are to be consistent with their founding principles. These various fields of study have also been both deeply influenced by, and important contributors to, the theoretical figurations associated with poststructuralism referred to by Linda Tuhiwai Smith in the above quotation. Thus, I will consider not only the implications of Deleuzian theory for indigenous politics, but also feminist and postcolonial deployments of Deleuzian concepts by Rosi Braidotti and Paul Patton respectively, and the relationship those deployments might have to broad goals of social justice. I have chosen Deleuze in particular because of his clear impact on contemporary social and political theory. Even when he is not directly referred to, Deleuze’s persuasive elaborations of concepts such as ‘nomad thought’, ‘bodies without organs’ and ‘rhizomes’ have led to a plethora of work within poststructuralist theorizing that strongly privileges notions of mobility, movement and becoming over conceptions of being, essence or stable subjectivity. This article is organized around what I consider to be one of the most important of these Deleuzian concepts in relation to my central concerns: nomad thought and/or nomadic subjectivity. I take on this task with a clear sense of its inherent limitations: with its theoretical gaze most strongly focused on principles of multiplicity, displacement and mobility, Deleuze’s work is particularly inhospitable to ‘capture’ by critics. In one of the variety of ways in which Deleuze and Guattari sketch out their project(s) in *A Thousand Plateaus,* they exhort their readers to ‘Make maps, not photos or drawings’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 25), and, for them, maps are far from a transparent or static two-dimensional guide to a given location. On the contrary, they use the term as one of many that represents a privileged site of multiplicity and flux, and as a limit towards which their own work aspires: ‘The map is open and connectable in all of its dimensions; it is detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant modification. It can be torn, reversed, adapted to any kind of mounting, reworked by anindividual, group, or social formation’ (1987: 12). Nonetheless – and decidedly in contrast to the spirit of Deleuze and Guattari’s own writing – I am required to define my terms of enquiry, and thus will begin this work by sketching out a working definition and elaboration of nomad thought/nomadic subjectivity in order to investigate how this concept operates within Deleuzian thought. I will then proceed to what I consider the most important focus of this article, namely an investigation of the ways in which other writers, namely Braidotti and Patton, have taken up Deleuze’s work, and consider how these deployments operate within the realm of indigenous politics. In other words, what interests me most is the question of what the effects of Deleuzian thinking might be within the realm of concrete political struggles. While I will go on to argue against a view that poses an essentialized material world against the abstract world of poststructuralist theory, nonetheless I believe questions of social justice within the ‘real’ world must be raised by feminist, postcolonial and cultural critics, and it is towards these questions that my analytical gaze is most strongly directed. Overall, throughout the article, I will make the case that Deleuzian thinking, both in its original renditions and subsequent deployments, strongly lends itself to the perpetuation of colonizing discourses in ways that work to undermine the possibility of effective indigenous politics. While such an outcome is not inevitable given the multiplicity of ways in which Deleuzian thought can be and, in fact, has been taken up, I will argue that Braidotti’s and Patton’s elaborations of Deleuzian thinking are consistent with dominant strands within that body of work, and hence serve as cautionary examples within this terrain.2

#### I advocate that we exorcize the AC as a project of releasing the specters that loom their gardens. As the material conditions of Native Americans have dwindled, the only viable option is to haunt the white subject to prevent Native erasure.

Kavanagh 11 (\*Sarah Schnyder Kavanagh pg. 171-173 Sarah Schneider Kavanagh's research focuses on the pedagogy of teacher education Postdoctoral Scholar at the University of Washington, “Haunting Remains: Educating a New American Citizenry at Indian Hill Cemetery”, Phantom Past, Indigenous Presence: Native Ghosts in North American Culture/ made in 2011/ edited by Colleen E. Boyd & thrush \*editorial chapters done by multiple authors, Kavanagh is one section // EBOOK DOA 9/1/16 KAE+GK)

According to Jaques Derrida “haunting belongs to the structure of every hegemony.” Renee Bergland, in The National Uncanny: Indian ghosts and American subjects, has unpacked Derrida’s statement thusly: “Power is unreal, insubstantial, somehow imaginary. At the same time, of course, it is undeniably real. **When we describe hegemonies as socially constructed, we mean that they are built on history, memory, fear and desire. They are made from the same things that ghosts are made from.** Because the politics of the national, the racial, the classed and the gendered are the politics of memory and false memory, they are also, necessarily, the politics of spectrality.” Paining Derrida and Bergland’s analysis of haunting with Richard White’s analysis of place (which states that places enact power and are constructed within hegemonic systems) leads me to claim that **all places are haunted**. Perhaps Indian Hill cemetery is a revealing site for an analysis of place as a haunting and haunted actor not because it is extraordinary, but because it is so ordinary, so commonplace. Through the haunting of Indian ghosts, through the construction of mythic Indian tropes, and through the presentation of national narrative mythologies, Indian Hill Cemetery haunts the very city it serves. **The place (re)presents power structures that are at once real and imaginary, tangible and insubstantial, here and not here. These tropes**, mythologies, and power structures **have been constructed** locally, nationally and internationally **for** **hundreds of years**, “built on history, memory, fear and desire.” “they are made,” Bergland observes, “from the same things that ghosts are made from.” And, in turn, ghosts have been made from them. The names and structures at Indian Hill Cemetery are physical metaphors that transmit ideological narratives. Tombstones, landscape design, and the name of the site itself are all tangible structures that stand in for and arrange into a meticulous order the “messy, ill constructed and jumbled” concepts of nation and race. These structural metaphors are haunted by the messages they were created to impart. At Indian Hill, hauntings are complicated by the fact that the Indian Ghost (that Olin suggests haunts the site) is itself a constructed structural metaphor. As discussed above, the Indian Ghost is introduced into the discourse surrounding Indian Hill Cemetery as a metaphor for the inevitable death of Native peoples; **it is a tool for Indigenous erasure**. If the Indian ghost itself is a structural metaphor, and metaphors are haunted by the messages that they impart, then, at Indian Hill, haunting ghosts are themselves haunted. The verb “to haunt” is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as “of unseen or immaterial visitants.” Thus, the creation of a metaphor is in fact the created of a haunted symbol. If a metaphor is defined by the simultaneous absence and presence of the “something else” that it is suggestive of, a metaphor then is a symbol that is constantly accompanied by that which is unseen or immaterial. Metaphors, symbols, and representations are all inherently haunted. What does the haunted nature of metaphor mean for a structure such as Indian Hill Cemetery, whose central metaphor is an Indian ghost? Could it be that the metaphoric ghost of Indian Hill is haunted not by the “imaginary or spiritual beings” but by narrative ideologies of nation, race, ethnocide, and removal? Could it be that at Indian Hill cemetery eve the ephemeral is haunted? In the speeches presented at the dedication ceremony, physical realities of history are treated as legend, and legends of lingering ghosts are treated as fact. **The physical fact of Native existence is denied, while the ephemeral Indian ghost is ensconced.** Indian Hill Cemetery was created to instill haunting citizenship into Middletown residents. In Olin’s words, the cemetery exerts “a real and powerful, though silent influence, in molding the character, and in exalting and purifying the sentiments of a people.” This “silent influence’ is attained through a manipulation of “Indian-ness” in an attempt to construct non-Native American history and identity and also through an expansion of spatial frontier mythology in Middletown. The cemetery was a project aimed at expanding patriotism and active citizenship. The site’s founders approached this project by creating Indian ghosts and erasing Native bodies. Indian Hill cemetery was established in an attempt to ensure that, **even as the visible remains of native people were removed, the special Indian, ghosted and forever haunting white citizenry, remains**

#### The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater that best recognizes the presence of spectrality. The specter is A priori to any ethical obligation or practice as it is the origin of such ethics, to live in and of it demands a politics of memory be burdened upon the individual. Life and death are one; the small passageway connecting the two is the resting place of memory.

Derrida 94’ Jacques Derrida, “Specters of Marx”, 1994, P 17 <http://m.friendfeed-media.com/411d68a9b887290f0f6a1621dad4ad2249ea7421>//KAE

But to learn to live, to learn it from oneself and by oneself, all alone, to teach oneself to live ("I would like to learn to live finally"), is that not impossible for a living being? Is it not what logic itself forbids? To live, by definition, is not something one learns. Not from oneself, it is not learned from life, taught by life. Only from the other and by death. In any case from the other at the edge of life. At the internal border or the external border, it is a heterodidactics between life and death. And yet nothing is more necessary than this wisdom. It is ethics itself: to learn to live-alone, from oneself, by oneself. Life does not know how to live otherwise. And does one ever do anything else but learn to live, alone, from oneself, by oneself? This is, therefore, a strange commitment, both impossible and necessary, for a living being supposed to be alive: "I would like to learn to live." It has no sense and cannot be just unless it comes to terms with death.2 Mine as (well as) that of the other. Between life and death, then, this is indeed the place of a sententious injunction that always feigns to speak like the just. What follows advances like an essay in the night-into the unknown of that which must remain to come-a simple attempt, therefore, to analyze with some consistency such an exordium: "I would like to learn to live. Finally" Finally what. If it - learning to live - remains to be done, it can happen only between life and death. Neither in life nor in death alone. What happens between two, and between all the "two's" one likes, such as between life and death, can only maintain itself with some ghost, can only talk with or about some ghost [s' entretenir de quelque fantomeJ. So it would be necessary to learn spirits. Even and especially if this, the spectral, is not. Even and especially if this, which is neither substance, nor essence, nor existence, is never present as such. The time of the "learning to live, a time without tutelary present, would amount to this, to which the exordium is leading us: to learn to live with ghosts, in the upkeep, the conversation, the company, or the companionship, in the commerce without commerce of ghosts. To live otherwise, and better. No, not better, but more justly. But with them. No being-with the other, no socius without this with that makes being-with in general more enigmatic than ever for us. And this being-with specters would also be, not only but also, a politics of memory, of inheritance, and of generations. If I am getting ready to speak at length about ghosts, inheritance, and generations, generations of ghosts, which is to say about certain others who are not present, nor presently living, either to us, in us, or outside us, it is in the name of justice. Of justice where it is not yet, not yet there, where it is no longer, let us understand where it is no longer present, and where it will never be, no more than the law, reducible to laws or rights.3 It is necessary to speak of the ghost, indeed to the ghost and with it, from the moment that no ethics, no politics, whether revolutionary or not, seems possible and thinkable and just that does not recognize in its principle the respect for those others who are no longer or for those others who are not yet there, presently living, whether they are already dead or not yet born.

#### Your becoming cannot overcome the colonialism in your project and leads to the exclusion of indigenous epistemologies

Wuthnow 02 (Julie Wuthnow, University of Canterbury, "Deleuze in the postcolonial: On nomads and indigenous politics", 2002, Feminist Theory Sage publishing, pp 188-190 //Accessed 10/12/16 GK)

In response to a similar critique by Dick Pels, Braidotti reiterates her position, yet with decidedly equivocal results: ‘a location is an embedded and embodied memory. It is a set of counter-memories which are activated by the resisting thinker against the grain of the dominant representations of subjectivity’ (Braidotti, 1999: 89). That a location would be an embedded and embodied memory does not seem problematic, yet it is worth asking why Braidotti positions these memories as necessarily *counter*-memories that ‘go against the grain’ of dominant representations. This formulation seems to preclude the possibility that the nomadic subject might be positioned as a *privileged* subject who may be completely comfortable with hegemonic representations. Such a presumption of innocence is worrying and falls far short of locating this nomadic subject according to the terms laid out by Rich. Braidotti makes a similar move a few pages later in relation to a discussion of accountability, where she refers to ‘a yearning or desire for change’ (1999: 92) embedded in the practice of accountability, which again seems to take for granted that the nomadic subject wishes for progressive political change. That any subject would necessarily be desirous of change with respect to aspects of identity that grant them privilege – for instance, whiteness – seems extremely dubious. While privileged subjects may indeed attempt to change or subvert aspects of identity that grant them privilege (for instance, Adrienne Rich’s attempts as a white woman to subvert white privilege), the path to such change is far from transparent or simple, and to presume that all such (feminist?) subjects will necessarily attempt and succeed in disavowing privilege is both theoretically and practically untenable. Accountability to location requires vigilance rather than presumption, and Braidotti is again highly selective in the ways in which she holds the nomadic subject accountable to ‘location’.4 Thus, the claim by Gedalof and others that her version of the nomadic subject is universalized and occupies the ‘unmarked norm’ in important respects holds considerable merit. Given Braidotti’s somewhat ‘orthodox’ application of Deleuzian thinking, this outcome is not surprising: according to Kaplan, a universalized and unmarked nomadic subject is logically consistent with the ways in which the model has been constructed. In her words: [Deleuze and Guattari’s] privileging of ‘nomadic’ modes relies upon an opposition between a central site of subjectivity and zones of marginality. Thus their advocacy of a process of ‘becoming minor’ depends upon the erasure of the site of their own subject positions. (Kaplan, 1996: 86) This erasure also has important implications for locating the production of knowledge. More specifically, it marginalizes ‘local knowledges’, that is, knowledges that are relegated to the periphery of hegemonic epistemologies by virtue of their ‘otherness’ to a universalized West. Epistemologies might be rendered peripheral or ‘local’ by virtue of being generated by the ‘wrong’ race, class or gender; more significantly for this article, they are also marginalized by virtue of emanating from the colonized other of the West. This is a theme that has been explored in some depth in Gayatri Spivak’s well-known essay ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ (1988), and Elspeth Probyn (1990) draws heavily on this work in her discussion of ‘the local’. Probyn formulates a definition of ‘location’ that begins to draw out the significance of the politics of knowledge and its linkage to colonized discursive spaces. It is . . . through a process of location, of fixing statements in relation to other established statements, that knowledge comes to be ordered. It is through this process that the knowledges produced in locale are denigrated as local, subaltern, and other. (1990: 185) The nomad cannot simply define herself as outside of this political ordering of knowledge and, through inattention to the implications of her own positioning as another rendition of the universalized western subject, the nomad perpetuates the hegemony of western ways of knowing and being: ‘[the] nomad . . . is posed as unthreatening, merely passing through; however, his person has questionable effects . . . the nomad camouflage[s] the theoretical problematic of the ontological implications of Western subjecthood’ (1990: 184). Thus, knowledges that could be characterized as ‘local’ are marginalized, adding further weight to the argument that Braidotti’s notion of the nomadic subject disempowers effective indigenous politics.

#### Deconstructing binaries doesn’t solve – historization is key to combat the state – this is in opposition to their openness to the future

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But is the nomad’s ostensible deconstruction of binaries an adequate response to the task of undoing the violence based on these categorizations? A number of critics suggest otherwise. In *Questions of Travel*, Caren Kaplan calls for ‘versions of poststructuralism that destabilize colonial discourses as overtly as they deconstruct logocentrism’ (1996: 24). She also argues that postmodern/poststructuralist configurations may not be as far removed from their modernist forebears as one might assume, and refers to ‘[t]he interdependency of modernist and postmodernist techniques of representation’ (1996: 10). In order to disrupt these unwitting reproductions of the modern and their concomitant associations with imperialist projects, one of the strategies Kaplan advocates is a historicization of terms such as ‘nomad’ and ‘traveller’ in order to discern their operation within colonialist discourses. Radhika Mohanram’s discussion of racialized embodiment begins to give a sense of why this task is important and what is at stake if it is neglected. According to Mohanram, disembodiment and mobility have a long history as significant features of constructions of the subjectivity of white settlers in colonial contexts, something that becomes particularly evident when they are juxtaposed with indigenous peoples constructed as embodied, immobile and objectified: While the indigene’s body comes into being and is shaped by native bioregions, the settler as exotica spreads like a weed but becomes disembodied not only because he is not in his native bioregion, but also because the Europeanization of the Neo-Europes makes the European the Universal Subject. . . . The Caucasian is disembodied, mobile, absent of the marks that physically immobilize the native. (Mohanram, 1999: 15) By failing to historicize the concept of mobility and its links to concrete practices of colonization, models of subjectivity that embrace nomad thought as a defining feature necessarily bring very problematic political baggage along for the ride. As mobile and disembodied, the nomadic subject is not locatable; as unlocatable, the nomadic subject cannot be held accountable for its social location, whether it be one of privilege or marginalization.